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Abstract
We consider an exchange who wishes to set suitable make-take fees to attract liq-
uidity on its platform. Using a principal-agent approach, we are able to describe
in quasi-explicit form the optimal contract to propose to a market maker. This
contract depends essentially on the market maker inventory trajectory and on the
volatility of the asset. We also provide the optimal quotes that should be displayed
by the market maker. The simplicity of our formulas allows us to analyze in details
the effects of optimal contracting with an exchange, compared to a situation without
contract. We show in particular that it leads to higher quality liquidity and lower
trading costs for investors.
Keywords: Make-take fees, market making, financial regulation, high-frequency trading,
principal-agent problem, stochastic control.
1 Introduction
With the fragmentation of financial markets, exchanges are nowadays in competition.
Indeed the traditional international exchanges are now challenged by alternative trading
venues, see [16]. Consequently, they have to find innovative ways to attract liquidity on
their platforms. One solution is to use a make-taker fees system, that is a rule enabling
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them to charge in an asymmetric way liquidity provision and liquidity consumption. The
most classical setting, used by many exchanges (such as Nasdaq, Euronext, BATS Chi-
X...), is of course to subsidize the former while taxing the latter. In practice, this means
associating a fee rebate to executed limit orders and applying a transaction cost for mar-
ket orders.
In the recent years, the topic of make-take fees has been quite controversial. Indeed make-
take fees policies are seen as a major facilitating factor to the emergence of a new type of
market makers aiming at collecting fee rebates: the high frequency traders. As stated by
the Securities and Exchanges commission in [26]: “Highly automated exchange systems
and liquidity rebates have helped establish a business model for a new type of profes-
sional liquidity provider that is distinct from the more traditional exchange specialist and
over-the-counter market maker.” The concern with high frequency traders becoming the
new liquidity providers is two-fold. First, their presence implies that slower traders no
longer have access to the limit order book, or only in unfavorable situations when high
frequency traders do not wish to support liquidity. This leads to the second classical
criticism against high frequency market makers: they tend to leave the market in time of
stress, see [3, 20, 21, 24] for detailed investigations about high frequency market making
activity.
From an academic viewpoint, studies of make-take fees structures and their impact on the
welfare of the markets have been mostly empirical, or carried out in rather stylized mod-
els. An interesting theory, suggested in [1] and developed in [5] is that make-take fees have
actually no impact on trading costs in the sense that the cum fee bid-ask spread should
not depend on the make-take fees policy. This result is consistent with the empirical
findings in [17, 19]. Nevertheless, it is clearly shown in these works that many important
trading parameters such as depths, volumes or price impact do depend on the make-take
fees structure, see also [12]. Furthermore, the idea of the neutrality of the make-take
fees schedule is also tempered in [10] where the authors show theoretically that make-take
fees may increase welfare of markets provided the tick size is not equal to zero, see also [4].
In this work, our aim is to provide a quantitative and operational answer to the question
of relevant make-take fees. To do so, we take the position of an exchange (or of the
regulator) wishing to attract liquidity. The exchange is looking for the best make-take
fees policy to offer to market makers in order to maximize its utility. In other words, it
aims at designing an optimal contract with the market marker to create an incentive to
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increase liquidity. For simplicity, we consider a single market maker in a non-fragmented
market.
Incentive theory has emerged in the 1970s in economics to model how a financial agent can
delegate the management of an output process to another agent. Let us recall the formal-
ism of principal-agent problems from the seminal works of Mirrlees [22] and Holmstro¨m
[13]. A principal aims at contracting with an agent who provides efforts to manage an
output process impacting the wealth of the principal. The principal is not able to control
directly the output process since he cannot decide the efforts made by the agent. In our
case, the principal is the exchange, the agent is the market maker, the efforts correspond
to the quality of the liquidity provided by the market maker (essentially the size of the
bid-ask spread proposed by the market maker) and the output process is the transactions
flow on the platform. Several economics papers have investigated this kind of problems
by identifying it with a Stackelberg equilibrium between the two parties. More precisely,
since the principal cannot control the work of the agent, he anticipates his best-reaction
effort for a given compensation. Knowing that, the principal aims at finding the best
contract.
In our work, we deal with a continuous-time principal-agent problem. Indeed, the ex-
change monitors the spread set by the market maker around a Brownian-type efficient
price and the transactions flow in continuous-time. Thus, we follow the stream of litera-
ture initiated in [14]. Then in [25], the author recasts such issue into a stochastic control
problem which has been further developed using backward stochastic differential equation
theory in [7]. See also [8] for related literature.
In this paper, although we work in a quite general and realistic setting, we are able to
solve our principal-agent problem. More precisely, we provide a quasi-explicit expression
for the optimal contract the exchange should propose to the market maker, and also for
the quotes the market maker should set. The optimal contract depends essentially on
the market maker inventory trajectory and on the volatility of the market. These simple
formulas enable us to analyze in details the effects for the welfare of the market of optimal
contracting with an exchange, compared to a situation without contract as in [2, 11]. We
notably show that using such contracts leads to reduced spreads and lower trading costs
for investors.
The paper is organized as follows. Our modeling approach is presented in Section 2. In
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particular, we define the market maker’s as well as the exchange’s optimization framework.
In Section 3, we compute the best response of the market maker for a given contract.
Optimal contracts are designed in Section 4 where we solve the exchange’s problem.
Then, in Section 5, we assess the benefits for market quality of the presence of an exchange
contracting optimally with a market maker. Finally, useful technical results are gathered
in an appendix.
2 The model
The framework considered throughout this paper is inspired by the seminal work [2] where
the authors consider the problem of optimal market making, but without the intervention
of an exchange. Let T > 0 be a final horizon time and (Ω,F) be a measurable space such
that Ω = Ωc× (Ωd)2 with Ωc the set of continuous functions from [0, T ] into R, Ωd the set
of piecewise constant ca`dla`g functions from [0, T ] into N and F the Borel algebra on Ω.
We consider the following canonical process (χt)t∈[0,T ] = (St, Nat , N
b
t )t∈[0,T ]
∀ω = (s, na, nb) ∈ Ω St(ω) = s(t), Nat (ω) = na(t), N bt (ω) = nb(t).
We endow the space (Ω,F) with F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] = (F ct ⊗ (Fdt )⊗2)t∈[0,T ] where (F ct )t∈[0,T ]
and (Fdt )t∈[0,T ] are the right-continuous completed filtrations associated with the compo-
nents of (χt)t∈[0,T ].
We consider a market where there is only one market maker. This market maker has a
view on the efficient price of the asset given by St. We assume that
St = S0 + σWt, t ∈ [0, T ], (1)
with S0 > 0, W a Brownian motion and σ > 0 the volatility of the price
1. For t ∈ [0, T ],
the market maker fixes the bid and ask prices P bt and P
a
t as follows
P bt = St − δbt and P at = St + δat .
We assume that the arrival of ask (resp. bid) market orders is modeled by a point process
(Nat )t∈[0,T ] (resp. (N
b
t )t∈[0,T ]) with intensity (λ
a
t )t∈[0,T ] (resp. (λ
b
t)t∈[0,T ]). We also suppose
that the volume of market orders is constant and equal to unity. Hence, the inventory
1In practice, the efficient price can be thought of as the mid-price of the asset.
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process of the market maker Q is given by
Qt = N
b
t −Nat , t ∈ [0, T ].
As in [11], we impose a critical absolute inventory q¯ ∈ N above which the market maker
stops quoting on the ask or bid side, i.e.
λat = λ
a
t 1I{Qt>−q¯}, and λ
b
t = λ
b
t1I{Qt<q¯}.
We expect the intensity of buy (resp. sell) market order arrivals to depend on the extra
cost of each trade payed by the market taker compared to the efficient price. This extra
cost is the sum of the spread δat (resp. δ
b
t ) imposed by the market maker and the trans-
action cost c > 0 collected by the exchange, as explained in Section 2.2. Moreover, we
recall that from classical financial economics results, see [9, 18, 28], the average number
of trades per unit of time is a decreasing function of the ratio between the spread and the
volatility. Hence, we assume that
λat = λ(δ
a
t )1I{Qt>−q¯}, and λ
b
t = λ(δ
b
t )1I{Qt<q¯}, with λ(x) = Ae
−k (x+c)
σ , (2)
for fixed positive constants A and k.
2.1 Admissible controls and market maker’s problem
We work with the set A of admissible controls (δt)t∈[0,T ] = (δat , δbt )t∈[0,T ] where any δ ∈ A
is predictable and satisfies
|δat | ∨ |δbt | ≤ δ∞, t ∈ [0, T ].
Here, δ∞ is a fixed positive constant which will be fixed later to a sufficiently large value.
For each control process δ = (δa, δb) of the market maker, we denote by Pδ the associated
probability measure under which S follows (1) and
N˜ δ,at = N
a
t −
∫ t
0
λ(δar )1I{Qr>−q¯}dr, N˜
δ,b
t = N
b
t −
∫ t
0
λ(δbr)1I{Qr<q¯}dr,
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are martingales. In that case, the profit and loss process of the market maker is defined
by
PLδt = X
δ
t +QtSt, where X
δ
t =
∫ t
0
P ar dN
a
r −
∫ t
0
P br dN
b
r , t ∈ [0, T ]. (3)
Here, Xδ is the cash flow process and QS represents the inventory risk process2.
Next, we introduce the Dole´ans-Dade exponential
Lδt = exp
(∫ t
0
log
(
λ(δar )
A
)
1I{Qr−>−q¯}dN
a
r + log
(
λ(δbr)
A
)
1I{Qr−<q¯}dN
b
r
−(λ(δar )− A)1I{Qr>−q¯}dr − (λ(δbr)− A)1I{Qr<q¯}dr
)
,
which is a P0−local martingale3 as it can be verified by direct application of Itoˆ’s formula
that
dLδt = L
δ
t
(
λ(δat )− A
A
1I{Qt−>−q¯}dN˜
0,a
t +
λ(δbt )− A
A
1I{Qt−<q¯}dN˜
0,b
t
)
.
Since δa and δb are uniformly bounded, this local martingale satisfies the Novikov-type
criterion in [27] and thus is a martingale. From Theorem III.3.11 in [15], it follows that
dPδ
dP0
∣∣∣
Ft
= Lδt , for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (4)
In particular, all the probability measures Pδ indexed by δ ∈ A are equivalent. We there-
fore use the notation a.s for almost surely without ambiguity. We shall write Eδt for the
conditional expectation with respect to Ft with probability measure Pδ.
We consider that the exchange is compensated for each market order arrival and so aims
at keeping the market liquid. Thus, we assume that it proposes to the market maker a
contract, defined by an FT -measurable random variable ξ, in order to create an incentive
to attract liquidity on the platform by reducing his spread. In addition to the realized
profit and loss (3) on [0, T ], the market maker receives a compensation ξ from the exchange
2As in [2], for sake of simplicity, we assume that the market maker estimates his inventory risk using
the efficient price S.
3P0 denotes the the probability measure Pδ associated to a vanishing spread δ = (δa, δb) = (0, 0).
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at the final time T , thus leading to the maximization problem,
VMM(ξ) = sup
δ∈A
JMM(δ, ξ) where JMM(δ, ξ) = Eδ
[
− e−γ(ξ+PLδT−PLδ0)
]
(5)
= Eδ
[
− e−γ
(
ξ+
∫ T
0 (δ
a
t dN
a
t +δ
b
tdN
b
t+QtdSt)
)]
.
Here, γ > 0 is the absolute risk aversion parameter of the CARA market maker. For each
compensation ξ, we show that there exists a unique optimal response δˆ(ξ) = (δˆa(ξ), δˆb(ξ))
of the market marker.
Remark 2.1. The case ξ = 0 corresponds to the problem without exchange intervention
treated in [2, 11].
2.2 The exchange optimal contracting problem
We assume that the exchange is compensated by a fixed amount c > 0 for each market
order that occurs in the market. In practice, some exchanges add to this fixed fee a com-
ponent which is proportional to the traded amount in currency value. However, since we
are anyway working on a short time interval, we take c independent of the price of the
asset. Note that the fee schedule considered here for the taker side is simple. Indeed, in
practice, complex fee policies are rather dedicated to market makers. Furthermore, we
will in fact see that when acting optimally, the exchange is somehow indifferent to the
value of c, see Section 4.3.
The exchange aims at maximizing the total number of market orders NaT −Na0 +N bT −N b0
arrived during the time interval [0, T ], whose arrival intensities are controlled exclusively
by the market maker. The role of the contract ξ proposed by the exchange to the market
maker is to encourage the latter to increase the liquidity of the market. In this case, the
profit and loss of the exchange is given by
c(NaT −Na0 +N bT −N b0)− ξ.
Thus the exchange optimally chooses the contract to maximize its CARA utility function
with absolute risk aversion parameter η > 0,
V E0 = sup
ξ∈C
Eδˆ(ξ)
[
− e−η(c(NaT−Na0 +NbT−Nb0)−ξ)
]
. (6)
We now define the set of admissible contracts C. Concerning the problem of the exchange,
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we need to ensure that Eδˆ(ξ)
[
− e−η(c(NaT−Na0 +NbT−Nb0)−ξ)
]
is not degenerated. The natural
condition that we need is then to assume that
sup
δ∈A
Eδ
[
eη
′ξ
]
< +∞, for some η′ > η. (7)
Since Na and N b are point processes with bounded intensities, this condition together
with a Ho¨lder inequality ensure that the problem of the exchange (6) is well defined.
Similarly, we will assume that
sup
δ∈A
Eδ
[
e−γ
′ξ
]
< +∞, for some γ′ > γ, (8)
to ensure that Eδ[−e−γ(ξ+
∫ T
0 (δ
a
t dN
a
t +δ
b
tdN
b
t+QtdSt))] is not degenerate and hence the well-
definition of the market maker problem (5). We will also assume that the latter only
accepts contracts ξ such that the maximal utility VMM(ξ) is above a threshold value R < 0.
Hence, we denote by C the space of admissible contracts defined by
C =
{
ξ FT -measurable such that VMM(ξ) ≥ R and (7) and (8) are satisfied
}
.
We will take −R large enough so that C contains the zero contract ξ = 0 and thus is
nonempty.
3 Solving the market maker’s problem
We start by solving the problem (5) of the market maker facing an arbitrary contract
ξ ∈ C proposed by the exchange.
3.1 Market maker’s optimal response
For (δ, z, q) ∈ [−δ∞, δ∞]2 × R3 × Z, with δ = (δa, δb) and z = (zS, za, zb), we define
h(δ, z, q) =
1− e−γ(za+δa)
γ
λ(δa)1I{q>−q¯} +
1− e−γ(zb+δb)
γ
λ(δb)1I{q<q¯},
and
H(z, q) = sup
|δa|∨|δb|≤δ∞
h(δ, z, q),
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For an arbitrary constant Y0 ∈ R and predictable processes Z = (ZS, Za, Zb), with∫ T
0
|ZSt |2 + |H(Zt, Qt)|dt <∞, we introduce the process
Y Y0,Zt = Y0 +
∫ t
0
Zar dN
a
r + Z
b
rdN
b
r + Z
S
r dSr +
(1
2
γσ2(ZSr +Qr)
2 −H(Zr, Qr)
)
dr, (9)
and we denote by Z the collection of all such processes Z such that Condition (7) is
satisfied with ξ = Y 0,ZT and
sup
δ∈A
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Eδ[e−γ′Y
0,Z
t ] <∞, for some γ′ > γ. (10)
Clearly, Z 6= ∅ as it contains all bounded predictable processes and
C ⊃ Ξ = {Y Y0,ZT : Y0 ∈ R, Z ∈ Z, and VMM(Y Y0,ZT ) ≥ R}.
The next result shows that these sets are in fact equal, and identifies the market maker
utility value and the corresponding optimal response. To prove equality of these sets, we
are reduced to the problem of representing any contract ξ ∈ C as ξ = Y Y0,ZT for some
(Y0, Z) ∈ R × Z, which is known in the literature as a problem of backward stochastic
differential equation. We refrain from using this terminology, as our analysis does not
require any result from this literature.
Theorem 3.1. (i) Any contract ξ ∈ C has a unique representation as ξ = Y Y0,ZT , for some
(Y0, Z) ∈ R×Z. In particular, C = Ξ.
(ii) Under this representation, the market maker utility value is
VMM
(
ξ
)
= −e−γY0 , so that Ξ =
{
Y Y0,ZT : Z ∈ Z, and Y0 ≥
−1
γ
log (−R)
}
,
with the following optimal bid-ask policy
δˆat (ξ) = ∆(Z
a
t ), δˆ
b
t (ξ) = ∆(Z
b
t ), where ∆(z) = (−δ∞)∨
{
−z+ 1
γ
log
(
1+
σγ
k
)}
∧δ∞. (11)
The proof of Part (i) of the previous result is reported in Section A.2. This representa-
tion is obtained by using the dynamic continuation utility process of the market maker,
following the approach of Sannikov [25]. We prove that the continuation utility process
satisfies the dynamic programming principle, so that the required representation follows
from the Doob-Meyer decomposition of supermartingales together with the martingale
representation theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1 (ii) Let ξ = Y Y0,ZT with (Y0, Z) ∈ R × Z. We first prove
that for an arbitrary bid-ask policy δ ∈ A, we have JMM(δ, ξ) ≤ −e−γY0 . Denote Y t =
Y Y0,Zt +
∫ t
0
δat dN
a
t + δ
b
tdN
b
t + QtdSt, t ∈ [0, T ]. By direct application of Itoˆ’s formula, we
see that
de−γY t = γe−γY t−
(
− (Qt + ZSt )dSt −
1
γ
(1− e−γ(Zat +δat ))dN˜ δ,at −
1
γ
(1− e−γ(Zbt+δat ))dN˜ δ,bt
+
(
H(Zt, Qt)− h(δt, Zt, Qt)
)
dt
)
.
Hence e−γY is a Pδ-local submartingale. Thanks to Condition (10), the uniform bound-
edness of the intensities of Na and N b and Ho¨lder inequality, (e−γY t)t∈[0,T ] is uniformly
integrable and hence is a true submartingale. By Doob-Meyer decomposition theorem,
we conclude that∫ ·
0
γe−γY t−
(− (Qt + ZSt )dSt − 1γ (1− e−γ(Zat +δat ))dN˜ δ,at − 1γ (1− e−γ(Zbt+δat ))dN˜ δ,bt ),
is a true martingale. It follows that
JMM(δ, ξ) = Eδ
[−e−γY T ] = −e−γY0−Eδ[ ∫ T
0
γe−γY t
(
H(Zt, Qt)−h(δt, Zt, Qt)
)
dt
]
≤ −e−γY0 .
On the other hand, equality holds in the last inequality if and only if δ is chosen as the
maximizer of the Hamiltonian H (dt × dP0−a.e.), thus leading to the unique maximizer
δˆ(ξ) given by (11), which then induces JMM(δˆ(ξ), ξ) = −e−γY0 . This completes the proof
that VMM(ξ) = −e−γY0 with optimal response δˆ(ξ).
4 Designing the optimal contract
Denote Yˆ0 = − 1γ log(−R). By Theorem 3.1, the exchange problem (6) reduces to the
control problem
V E0 = sup
Y0≥Yˆ0
sup
Z∈Z
Eδˆ(Y
Y0,Z
T )
[
− e−η
(
c(NaT−Na0 +NbT−Nb0)−Y
Y0,Z
T
)]
, (12)
where Y Y0,Z is given by (9). In the present context, notice that the market maker optimal
response δˆ(Y Y0,ZT ) given by (11) does not depend on Y0, i.e δˆ(Y
Y0,Z
T ) = δˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T ). Hence,
the objective function in (12) is clearly decreasing in Y0 implying that the maximization
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under the participation constraint is achieved at Yˆ0,
V E0 = e
ηYˆ0 sup
Z∈Z
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )
[
− e−η
(
c(NaT−Na0 +NbT−Nb0)−Y 0,ZT
)]
. (13)
4.1 The HJB equation for the reduced exchange problem
Motivated by (13), we study in this section the HJB equation corresponding to the stochas-
tic control problem
vE0 = sup
Z∈Z
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )
[
− e−η
(
c(NaT−Na0 +NbT−Nb0)−Y 0,ZT
)]
. (14)
Our approach is to derive a solution v of the corresponding HJB equation, and to proceed
by the standard verification argument in stochastic control to prove that the proposed
solution v coincides with the value function vE0 .
Applying the standard dynamic programming approach to the last control problem, we
are led to the following HJB equation∂tv(t, q) +HE
(
q, v(t, q), v(t, q + 1), v(t, q − 1)) = 0, q ∈ {−q¯, · · · q¯}, t ∈ [0, T ),
v(T, q) = −1,
(15)
where the Hamiltonian HE : [−q¯, q¯]× (−∞, 0]3 → R is given by
HE(q, y, y+, y−) = H1E(q, y) + 1I{q>−q¯}H
0
E(y, y−) + 1I{q<q¯}H
0
E(y, y+), (16)
with
H1E(q, y) = sup
zs∈R
h1E(q, y, zs), and h
1
E(q, y, zs) =
ησ2
2
y
(
γ(zs + q)
2 + ηz2s
)
,
H0E(y, y
′) = sup
ζ∈R
h0E(y, y
′, ζ) and h0E(y, y
′, ζ) = λ
(
∆(ζ)
)[
y′eη(ζ−c) − y(1 + η 1− e−γ(ζ+∆(ζ))
γ
)]
.
A direct calculation reported in Lemma A.4 below reveals that the maximizers zˆ =
(zˆs, zˆa, zˆs) of HE are
zˆs(t, q) = − γ
γ + η
q, zˆa(t, q) = ζˆ
(
v(t, q), v(t, q − 1)), and zˆb(t, q) = ζˆ(v(t, q), v(t, q + 1)),
(17)
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where
ζˆ(y, y′) = ζ0 +
1
η
log
( y
y′
)
, ζ0 = c+
1
η
log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
)
.
Here, we assume that δ∞ is large enough so that Condition (37) of Lemma A.4 is always
met, namely
δ∞ ≥ C∞ + 1
η
sup
t∈[0,T ]
sup
q∈[−q¯,q¯−1]
∣∣∣∣log( v(t, q)v(t, q + 1)
)∣∣∣∣ (18)
with the hope that our candidate solution of the HJB equation will verify it. This will be
checked in our verification argument. Recall from Lemma A.4 that
C∞ = c+ (
1
η
+
1
γ
) log(1 +
σγ
k
)− 1
η
log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
)
.
Using again the calculation reported in Lemma A.4, we rewrite the HJB equation (15) as∂tv(t, q) +
γη2σ2
2(γ+η)
q2v(t, q)− Cv(t, q)
[
1I{q>−q¯}
(
v(t,q)
v(t,q−1)
) k
ση + 1I{q<q¯}
(
v(t,q)
v(t,q+1)
) k
ση
]
= 0,
v(T, q) = −1,
(19)
where the constant C is given by
C = A
ση
k
exp
(
− k
σγ
log(1 +
σγ
k
) + (1 +
k
ση
) log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
))
.
Inspired by [11], we now make the key observation that this equation can be reduced to
a linear equation by introducing u = (−v)− kση . Indeed, by direct substitution, we obtain
the following linear differential equation∂tu(t, q)− C1q2u(t, q) + C2
(
u(t, q + 1)1I{q<q¯} + u(t, q − 1)1I{q>−q¯}
)
= 0, t ∈ [0, T ),
u(T, q) = 1,
(20)
with
C1 =
kγησ
2(γ + η)
and C2 = C
k
ση
.
This equation can be written in terms of the R2q¯+1−valued function u(t) = (u(t, q))
q∈{−q¯,...,q¯},
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of the variable t only, as the linear ordinary differential equation
∂tu = −Bu, where B =

−C1q¯2 C2
. . . . . . . . .
C2 −C1q2 C2
. . . . . . . . .
C2 −C1q¯2

← q-th line,
is a tri-diagonal matrix with lines labelled −q¯, . . . , q¯. Denote by bq the vector of R2q¯+1
with zeros everywhere except at the position q, i.e. bq,i = 1I{i=q} for i ∈ {−q¯, . . . , q¯}, and
1 =
∑q¯
q=−q¯ bq. Then, this ODE has a unique solution
u(t) = e(T−t)B1, so that u(t, q) = bq ·e(T−t)B1, and v(t, q) = −
(
bq ·e(T−t)B1
)−ση
k . (21)
In the next section, we shall prove that this solution v of the HJB equation (15) coin-
cides with the value function of the reduced exchange problem (14), with optimal controls
zˆ(t, q) given in (17), thus inducing the optimal contract Y Yˆ0,ZˆT with Zˆt = zˆ(t, Qt−).
We conclude this section by an alternative representation of the function u.
Proposition 4.1. Let u and v be defined by (21). The function u can be represented as
u(t, q) = E
[
e
∫ T
t (−C1(Qt,qs )2+λs+λs)ds
]
,
where Qt,qs = q +
∫ s
t
d(Nu − Nu), and (N,N) is a two-dimensional point process with
intensity (λs, λs) = C2(1I{Qs−<q¯}, 1I{Qs−>−q¯}). In particular, we have the following bounds
for the function u,
e−C1q¯
2T ≤ u ≤ e2C2T .
Moreover, Condition (18) is verified when
δ∞ ≥ ∆∞ = C∞ + σ
k
(2C2 + C1q¯
2)T. (22)
Proof. Notice that u is a smooth bounded function. Denote f(x) = −C1x2 +C2(1I{x>−q¯}+
1I{x<q¯}), and Ms = e
∫ s
t f(Q
t,q
u )duu(s,Qt,qs ), t ≤ s ≤ T . We now show that M is a martingale,
so that u(t, q) = Mt = E[MT ] = E
[
e−
∫ T
t f(Q
t,q
s )ds
]
, as u(T, .) = 1. To see that M is a
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martingale, we compute by Itoˆ’s formula that
dMs =
[
u(s,Qt,qs )f(Q
t,q
s ) + ∂tu(s,Q
t,q
s )
]
ds
+C2
[
u(s,Qt,qs− + 1)− u(s,Qt,qs−)
]
dN s + C2
[
u(s,Qt,qs− − 1)− u(s,Qt,qs−)
]
dN s.
Since u is solution of (20), we get
dMs = C2
[
u(s,Qt,qs− + 1)− u(s,Qt,qs−)
]
dM s + C2
[
u(s,Qt,qs− − 1)− u(s,Qt,qs−)
]
dM s,
where (M,M) = (N − ∫ ·
0
λsds,N −
∫ ·
0
λsds) is a martingale. The martingale property of
M now follows from the boundedness of u as it can be verified from the expression (21).
Finally, the bound |Qt,qs | ≤ q¯ induces directly the announced bounds on u, which in turn
imply Condition (18) when (22) is satisfied because v = −u−σηk .
4.2 Main result
We are now ready to verify that the function v introduced in the previous section is the
value function of the exchange, with optimal feedback controls (zˆs, zˆa, zˆb) as given in (17),
thus identifying a unique optimal contract to be proposed by the exchange to the market
maker. Recall that δ∞ denotes the bound on the market maker bid and ask spreads. Our
main explicit solution requires δ∞ to be larger that the constant ∆∞ introduced in (22).
Theorem 4.1. Assume that δ∞ ≥ ∆∞, with ∆∞ given by (22) and define u and v by
(21). Then the optimal contract for the problem of the exchange (6) is given by
ξˆ = Yˆ0 +
∫ T
0
Zˆar dN
a
r + Zˆ
b
rdN
b
r + Zˆ
S
r dSr +
(1
2
γσ2
(
ZˆSr +Qr
)2 −H(Zˆr, Qr))dr, (23)
with ZˆSr = zˆ
s(r,Qr−), Zˆar = zˆ
a(r,Qr−), and Zˆbr = zˆ
b(r,Qr−) as defined in (17). The
market maker’s optimal effort is given by
δˆat = δˆ
a
t (ξˆ) = −Zˆat +
1
γ
log(1 +
σγ
k
), δˆbt = δˆ
b
t (ξˆ) = −Zˆbt +
1
γ
log(1 +
σγ
k
). (24)
Proof. In order to prove this result, we verify that the function v introduced in (21) co-
incides at (0, Q0) with the value function of the reduced exchange problem (14), with
maximum achieved at the optimal control Zˆ.
The function v is negative bounded and has bounded gradient. Moreover, since δ∞ ≥ ∆∞,
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it follows that v is a solution of the HJB equation (15) of the exchange reduced problem,
see Lemma A.4. For Z ∈ Z, denote
KZt = e
−η
(
c(Nat −Na0 +Nbt−Nb0)−Y 0,Zt
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
By direct application of Itoˆ’s formula, and substitution of ∂tv from the HJB equation
satisfied by v, we see that
d
[
v(t, Qt)K
Z
t
]
= KZt−
(
(hZt −Ht)dt+ ηv(t, Qt)Zst dSt
+
∑
i=a,b
[
v(t, Qt− + ∆Qt)e−η(c−Z
i
t) − v(t, Qt−)
]
dN˜
δˆ(Y Yˆ0,Z),i
t
)
, (25)
where, using the notations of (16) and the subsequent equations,
Ht = HE
(
Qt, v(t, Qt), v(t, Qt + 1), v(t, Qt − 1)
)
,
and
hZt = h
1
E
(
Qt, v(t, Qt), Z
S
t ) + 1I{Qt>−q¯}h
0
E
(
v(t, Qt), v(t, Qt − 1), Zat
)
+ 1I{Qt<q¯}h
0
E
(
v(t, Qt), v(t, Qt + 1), Z
b
t
)
.
Exploiting the fact that v is bounded and that KZ is uniformly integrable, see Lemma
A.5, we get that
(
v(t, Qt)K
Z
t
)
t∈[0,T ] is a P
δˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )-supermartingale and by Doob-Meyer
decomposition theorem, the local martingale term in (25) is a true martingale. Hence
v(0, Q0) = Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )
[
v(T,QT )K
Z
T +
∫ T
0
KZt (Ht − hZt )dt
]
≥ Eδˆ(Y Yˆ0,ZT )[v(T,QT )KZT ] = Eδˆ(Y Yˆ0,ZT )[−KZT ],
by the boundary condition v(T, .) = −1. By arbitrariness of Z ∈ Z, this provides the
inequality v(0, Q0) ≥ supZ∈Z Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ 0,Z
T )[−KZT ] = vE0 .
On the other hand, consider the maximizer Zˆ of the reduced exchange problem, induced
by the feedback controls zˆ in (17). As Zˆ is bounded, it follows that Zˆ ∈ Z. Moreover,
hZˆ − H = 0, by definition, so that the last argument leads to the equality v(0, Q0) =
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Zˆ
T )
[ −KZˆT ], instead of the inequality. This shows that v(0, Q0) = vE0 , the reduced
exchange problem of (14), with optimal control Zˆ. From Theorem 3.1, the corresponding
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optimal market maker response of the market maker is given by (11) with ξ = Y Yˆ0,ZˆT .
Moreover, Condition (18) implies that∣∣∣∣−Zit + 1γ log
(
1 +
σk
k
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ∞, i = a, b.
Hence the optimal effort could be reduced to (24).
4.3 Discussion
The processes Zˆa, Zˆb and ZˆS allowing the exchange to build the optimal contract have
actually quite natural interpretations. Indeed, using Lemma 4.1, we obtain that the
quantities
− log
( u(t, Qt−)
u(t, Qt− − 1)
)
and − log
( u(t, Qt−)
u(t, Qt− + 1)
)
are roughly proportional respectively to Qt− and −Qt−. Thus, when the inventory is
highly positive, the exchange provides incentives to the market-maker so that it attracts
buy market orders and tries to dissuade him to accept more sell market orders, and
conversely for a negative inventory. The integral∫ T
0
ZˆSr dSr
can be understood as a risk sharing term. Indeed,
∫ t
0
QrdSr corresponds to the price
driven component of the inventory risk QtSt. Hence in the optimal contract, the ex-
change supports part of this risk so that the market maker maintains reasonable quotes
despite some inventory. The proportion of risk handled by the platform is γ
γ+η
.
Until now, we have focused on the maker part of the make-take fees problem since we
have considered that the taker cost c is fixed. Nevertheless, our approach also enables
us to suggest the exchange a relevant value for c. Actually, we see that when acting
optimally, the exchange transfers the totality of the fixed taker fee c to the market maker.
It is therefore neutral to the value of c as its optimal utility function vE0 = v(0, Q0) is
independent of the taker cost, see (19). However, c plays an important role in the optimal
spread offered by the market maker given by
−2c+ σ
k
log
( u(t, Qt−)2
u(t, Qt− − 1)u(t, Qt− + 1)
)
− 2
η
log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
)
+
2
γ
log(1+
σγ
k
).
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Furthermore, from numerical computations, we remark that
u(t, q)2
u(t, q − 1)u(t, q + 1)
is close to unity for any t and q. Hence the exchange may fix in practice the transaction
cost c so that the spread is close to one tick by setting
c ≈ −1
2
Tick− 1
η
log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
)
+
1
γ
log(1 +
σγ
k
).
For σγ/k small enough, this equation reduces to
c ≈ σ
k
− 1
2
Tick. (26)
Equation (26) is a particularly simple formula to fix the taker constant c. We see that the
higher the volatility, the larger the taker cost should be. It is also quite natural that this
cost is a decreasing function of k. Indeed, if k is large, the liquidity vanishes rapidly when
the spread becomes wide, meaning that market takers are sensitive to extra costs relative
to the efficient price. Therefore, the taker cost has to be small if the exchange wants to
maintain a reasonable market order flow. Finally, note that the parameters σ and k can
be easily estimated from market data. Therefore the formula (26) can be readily used in
practice.
5 Impact of the presence of the exchange on market
quality and comparison with [2, 11]
In this section, we compare our setting with the situation without incentive policy from
an exchange towards market making activities. The latter is considered in [2, 11] where
the authors deal with the issue of optimal market making without intervention of the
exchange. The results in [2] are taken as benchmark for our investigation to emphasize
the impact of the incentive policy on market quality. We will refer to this case as the
neutral exchange case.
Let us first recall the results in [2, 11]. The optimal controls of the market maker denoted
by δ˜a and δ˜b are given as a function of the inventory Qt by
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δ˜at =
σ
k
log
( u˜(t, Qt−)
u˜(t, Qt− − 1)
)
+
1
γ
log(1 +
σγ
k
),
δ˜bt =
σ
k
log
( u˜(t, Qt−)
u˜(t, Qt− + 1)
)
+
1
γ
log(1 +
σγ
k
),
where u˜ is the unique solution of the linear differential equation∂tu˜(t, q) + C˜1q2u˜(t, q)− C˜2(u˜(t, q + 1)1I{q<q¯} + u˜(t, q − 1)1I{q>−q¯}) = 0, (t, q) ∈ [0, T )× [−q¯, q¯]u˜(T, q) = 1,
with C˜1 =
σγk
2
and C˜2 = A exp
(− (1 + σγ
k
) log(1 + σγ
k
)
)
. In our case, the optimal quotes
δˆa and δˆb are obtained from Theorem 4.1 and satisfy
δˆat =
σ
k
log
( u(t, Qt−)
u(t, Qt− − 1)
)
+
1
γ
log(1 +
σγ
k
)− c− 1
η
log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
)
,
δˆbt =
σ
k
log
( u(t, Qt−)
u(t, Qt− + 1)
)
+
1
γ
log(1 +
σγ
k
)− c− 1
η
log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
)
,
where u is solution of the linear equation (20).
Numerical experiments show that u and u˜ can decrease quickly to zero when q becomes
large. Hence, the computation of the following crucial quantities appearing in the optimal
quotes:
v+(t, q) = log
(u(t, q + 1)
u(t, q)
)
, v˜+(t, q) = log
( u˜(t, q + 1)
u˜(t, q)
)
, q ∈ {−q¯, · · · , q¯ − 1}.
can be intricate in practice. To circumvent this numerical difficulty, we remark that v+
and v˜+ are solution of the following differential equations∂tv+(t, q) + C1(2q + 1)− C2(ev+(t,q+1)1I{q<q¯−1} + e−v+(t,q) − ev+(t,q) − e−v+(t,q−1)1I{q>−q¯}) = 0v+(T, q) = 0,
(27)
and∂tv˜+(t, q) + C˜1(2q + 1)− C˜2(ev˜+(t,q+1)1I{q<q¯−1} + e−v˜+(t,q) − ev˜+(t,q) − e−v˜+(t,q−1)1I{q>−q¯}) = 0v˜+(T, q) = 0.
(28)
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We thus rather apply classical finite difference schemes to (27) and (28).
In the following numerical illustrations, in the spirit of [11, Section 6], we take T = 600s
for an asset with volatility σ = 0.3 Tick.s−1/2 (unless specified differently). Market orders
arrive according to the intensities (2) with A = 1.5s−1 and k = 0.3s−1/2. We assume that
the threshold inventory of the market maker is q¯ = 50 units and we set his risk aversion
parameter to γ = 0.01. The exchange is taken more risk averse with η = 1. Finally, we
assume that the taker cost c = 0.5 Tick4.
5.1 Impact of the exchange on the spread and market liquidity
We start by comparing the optimal spread δˆa0 + δˆ
b
0 at time 0 obtained when contracting
optimally with the spread without incentives towards market making activities δ˜a0 + δ˜
b
0.
The optimal spreads are plotted in Figure 1 for different initial inventory values Q0 ∈
{−q¯, · · · , q¯}.
Figure 1: Comparison of optimal initial spreads with/without incentive policy from the
exchange.
We observe in Figure 1 that the initial spread does not depend a lot on the initial inven-
tory (because the considered time interval [0, T ] is not too small) and that it is reduced
thanks to the optimal contract between the market maker and the exchange. This is not
surprising since in our case the exchange aims at increasing the market order flow by
proposing an incentive contract to the market maker inducing a spread reduction. Actu-
ally this phenomenon occurs over the whole trading period [0, T ]. To see this, we generate
5000 paths of market scenarios and compute the average spread over [0, T ] for an initial
inventory Q0 = 0. The results are given in Figure 2.
4Note that the taker cost is chosen according to Criteria (26). We expect the optimal spread to be
close to one tick.
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Figure 2: Average spread on [0, T ] with 95% confidence interval, with/without incentive
policy from the exchange toward the market maker.
Since the spread is tighter during the trading period under an incentive policy from the
exchange, the arrival intensity of market orders is more important and hence the market
is more liquid as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Average order flow on [0, T ] with 95% confidence interval, with/without incen-
tive policy from the exchange.
We now consider in Figure 4 the bid and ask sides separately. We see that when the
inventory is positive and very large, δˆa and δ˜a are negative. It means the market maker is
ready to sell at prices lower than the efficient price in order to attract market orders and
reduce his inventory risk. On the contrary, if the inventory is negative and very large, in
both situations, its ask quotes are well above the efficient price in order to repulse the
arrival of buy market orders. However, since in our case the exchange remunerates the
market maker for each arrival of market order, we get that the ask spread with contract
δˆa is smaller than δ˜a. A symmetric conclusion holds for the bid part of the spread.
20
Figure 4: Optimal ask and bid spreads, with/without incentive policy from the exchange
toward the market maker.
We now turn to the impact of the volatility on the spread. The optimal contract obtained
in (23) induces an inventory risk sharing phenomenon through the term ZˆS. Hence, when
the volatility increases, the spread difference between situations with/without incentive
policy becomes less important, see Figure 5 in which we consider the optimal initial spread
difference when the initial inventory is set to zero between both situations with/without
incentive policy from the exchange to the market maker for different values of the volatility.
Figure 5: The initial optimal spread difference between both situation with/without in-
centive policy from the exchange toward the market maker as a decreasing function of the
volatility σ.
5.2 Impact of the incentive policy on the profit and loss of the
exchange and market maker
We assume that Q0 = 0. Recall that PL
δ defined in (3) denotes the trading part of
the profit and loss (P&L) of the market maker for a given strategy δ. In our case, the
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underlying total P&L at time t of a market maker acting optimally, denoted by PL?t , is
given by
PL?t = PL
δˆ
t + Y
Yˆ0,Zˆ
t ,
where Y Yˆ0,Zˆt corresponds to the quantity on the right hand side of (23) with T replaced by
t. We now investigate the behavior of this quantity, notably with respect to the benchmark
PLδ˜t which corresponds to the optimal profit and loss without intervention of the exchange.
To make PL?t and PL
δ˜
t comparable, we choose Yˆ0 in (23) so that the market maker gets
the same utility in both situations, that is Yˆ0 =
k
σ
log(u˜(0, Q0)). Thus, the market maker
is indifferent between the situation with or without exchange intervention. We generate
5000 paths of market scenarios and compare the average of both P&L in Figure 6 with
and without incentive policy.
Figure 6: Average P&L of the market maker on [0, T ] with 95% confidence interval,
with/without incentive policy from the exchange.
Since Yˆ0 is set to obtain the same utility in both cases, the two average P&L are very
close at the end of the trading period. The variance of the P&L also seems to be the same
in both situations. The only difference from the market maker viewpoint here is that in
the case of a contract, the P&L is already made at time 0 thanks to the compensation of
the exchange and then fluctuates slightly. This is because he is earning the spread but
paying continuous “coupons”
(
H(Zˆt, Qt) − σ2γ2 (ZˆSt + Qt)2
)
dt from the contract. In the
case without exchange intervention, the market maker increases his P&L over the whole
trading period thanks to the spread.
We now compare the profit and loss of the exchange in the two considered cases. When it
applies an incentive policy towards the market maker, the P&L of the exchange is given
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by c(Nat − Na0 + N bt − N b0) − Y Yˆ0,Zˆt . When the exchange is neutral, its P&L is simply
c(Nat −Na0 +N bt −N b0). We compare these two quantities in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Average P&L of the exchange on [0, T ] with 95% confidence interval,
with/without incentive policy from the exchange.
We see that the initial P&L of the contracting exchange is negative because of the initial
payment Yˆ0. However it finally exceeds, with a smaller standard deviation, the P&L in the
situation without incentive policy from the exchange. Hence the incentive policy of the
exchange proves to be successful. Indeed, both configurations are equivalent for market
makers but the exchange obtains more revenues when contracting optimally. This is due
to the fact that the contract triggers more market orders.
Finally, we plot the aggregated average P&L of the market maker and the exchange
(independent of the choice of the initial payment). We observe that it is always greater
in the optimal contract case.
Figure 8: Average total P&L of the exchange and the market maker on [0, T ] with 95%
confidence interval, with/without incentive policy from the exchange.
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5.3 Impact of the incentive policy on the trading cost
We now study the impact of the incentive policy on the investors, viewed as the market
takers. We assume that there is only one market taker. In the case without exchange, with
the specified parameters and under optimal reaction of the market maker, this investor
buys on average 200 shares over [0, T ]. To make the comparison with the case with
exchange intervention, we modify the parameter A appearing in the intensity (2) when
simulating a market with optimal contract. This new value is chosen so that the investor
buys on average the same number of assets (200) over the time period. This amounts to
take A = 0.9s−1. We confirm in Figure 9 that the average ask order flows agree in both
situations.
Figure 9: Setting similar average ask order flows on [0, T ] by taking different intensity
basis A in the case with and in the case without incentive policy; 95% confidence interval.
We finally compare in Figure 10 the average cost of trading for the market taker
Eδ
[ ∫ T
0
δat dN
a
t
]
,
with and without incentive.
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Figure 10: Average trading cost on [0, T ] with 95% confidence interval, with/without
incentive policy from the exchange.
We see that, thanks to the incentive policy of the exchange, the reduced spreads lead to
significantly smaller trading costs for investors.
A Appendix
A.1 Predictable representation
The following result is probably well-known, we report it here for completeness as we
could not find a precise reference.
Lemma A.1. Let (Ω,F ,P,F) be a filtered probability space where F = FW∨FN is the right
continuous completed filtration of a Brownian motion W and a d-dimensional integrable
point process N = (N1, · · · , Nd) with compensator A = (A1, · · · , Ad). Then, for any
F−martingale X there exists a predictable process Z = (ZW , Z1, · · · , Zd) such that
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
ZWs dWs +
d∑
i=1
∫ t
0
Zis(dN
i
s − dAis).
Proof. For sake of simplicity, we take d = 1. Let P be a solution of the martingale problem
associated to Mt = Nt − At and Wt. By Theorem III.4.29 in [15], to prove Lemma A.1
we need to establish the uniqueness of P.
We denote by PW the law P conditional on W . We first show that M is still a martingale
under PW . To do so we consider Bs ∈ Fs and want to prove that
EPW
[
1IBs(Mt −Ms)
]
= 0,
for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . Let C ∈ FWT . We aim at showing that
E
[
1CEP
W [
1IBs(Mt −Ms)
]]
= E
[
1IC1IBs(Mt −Ms)
]
= 0.
Thanks to the martingale representation theorem for Brownian martingales, we can write
1IC = αs +
∫ T
s
φudWu,
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where αs = E[1IC |FWs ] and (φu)u≥0 is FW predictable process. Using the martingale
property of M , we obtain
E
[
αs1IBs(Mt −Ms)
]
= 0.
Then W and M being orthogonal martingales, we deduce
E
[ ∫ T
s
φudWu1IBs(Mt −Ms)
]
= 0,
Consequently, using Theorem III.1.21 in [15], PW is the unique probability measure such
that M is an F-martingale conditional on W . Finally, by integration, the uniqueness of
PW implies that of P.
A.2 Dynamic programming principle and contract representa-
tion
For all F-stopping time τ with values in [t, T ] and for any µ ∈ Aτ , we define5
JT (τ, µ) = Eµτ
[
−e−γ
∫ T
τ (µ
a
udN
a
u+µ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)e−γξ
]
, and Jτ,T = (JT (τ, µ))µ∈Aτ ,
where Aτ denotes the restriction of A to controls on [τ, T ]. The continuation utility of
the market maker is defined for all F-stopping time τ by
Vτ = ess sup
µ∈Aτ
JT (τ, µ).
Lemma A.2. Let τ be an F-stopping time with values in [t, T ]. Then, there exists a
non-decreasing sequence (µn)n∈N in Aτ such that Vτ = lim
n→+∞
↑ JT (τ, µn).
Proof. For µ and µ′ inAτ , define µˆ = µ1I{JT (τ,µ)≥JT (τ,µ′)}+µ′1I{JT (τ,µ)<JT (τ,µ′)}. Then µˆ ∈ Aτ
and by definition of µˆ
JT (τ, µˆ) ≥ max (JT (τ, µ), JT (τ, µ′)) .
Hence Jτ,T is directly upwards, and the required result folows from [23, Proposition VI.I.I
p121].
Lemma A.3. Let t ∈ [0, T ] and τ be an F-stopping time with values in [t, T ]. Then,
Vt = ess sup
δ∈A
Eδt
[
− e−γ
∫ τ
t (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)Vτ
]
.
5From (4), notice that for any δ ∈ A, the conditional expectation Eδτ depends only on the restriction
of δ on [τ, T ]. Hence Eµτ is defined without ambiguity for µ ∈ Aτ .
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Proof. Let t ∈ [0, T ] and set an F-stopping time τ with values in [t, T ]. The proof is
similar to [6, Proof of Proposition 6.2]. First, by the tower property,
Vt = ess sup
δ∈A
Eδt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)Eδτ
[
−e−γ(
∫ T
τ (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)+ξ)
] ]
.
For all δ ∈ A, the quotient LδT
Lδτ
does not depend on the values of δ before time τ . Then,
Eδτ
[
−e−γ(
∫ T
τ (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)+ξ)
]
= E0τ
[
−L
δ
T
Lδτ
e−γ(
∫ T
τ (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)+ξ)
]
≤ ess sup
µ∈Aτ
Eµτ
[
−e−γ(
∫ T
τ (µ
a
udN
a
u+µ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)+ξ)
]
= Vτ ,
Then,
Vt ≤ ess sup
δ∈A
Eδt
[
Vτe
−γ ∫ τt (δaudNau+δbudNbu+QudSu)].
We next prove the reverse inequality. Let δ ∈ A and µ ∈ Aτ . We define (δ ⊗τ µ)u =
δu10≤u<τ + µu1τ≤u≤T . Then δ ⊗τ µ ∈ A and
Vt ≥ Eδ⊗τµt
[
−e−γ
( ∫ τ
t (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)+
∫ T
τ (µ
a
udN
a
u+µ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)
)
e−γξ
]
= Eδ⊗τµt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)Eδ⊗τµτ
[
− e−γ
∫ T
τ (µ
a
udN
a
u+µ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)e−γξ
]]
.(29)
From Bayes’ Formula and by noticing that
Lδ⊗τµT
Lδ⊗τµτ
=
LµT
Lµτ
, we get
Eδ⊗τµτ
[
−e−γ
∫ T
τ (µ
a
udN
a
u+µ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)e−γξ
]
= E0τ
[
Lδ⊗τµT
Lδ⊗τµτ
(
−e−γ
∫ T
τ (µ
a
udN
a
u+µ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)e−γξ
)]
= JT (τ, µ).
Thus, Inequality (29) becomes
Vt ≥ Eδ⊗τµt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)JT (τ, µ)
]
.
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By using again Bayes’ Formula and by noticing that L
δ⊗τµ
τ
Lδ⊗τµt
= L
δ
τ
Lδt
, we have
Vt ≥
E0t
[
Lδ⊗τµT e
−γ ∫ τt (δaudNau+δbudNbu+QudSu)JT (τ, µ)
]
Lδ⊗τµt
= E0t
[
E0τ
[Lδ⊗τµT
Lδ⊗τµτ
Lδ⊗τµτ
Lδ⊗τµt
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)JT (τ, µ)
]]
= E0t
[
E0τ
[Lδ⊗τµT
Lδ⊗τµτ
]Lδ⊗τµτ
Lδ⊗τµt
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)JT (τ, µ)
]
= E0t
[
Lδ⊗τµτ
Lδ⊗τµt
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)JT (τ, µ)
]
= Eδt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)JT (τ, µ)
]
.
Since the previous inequality holds for all µ ∈ Aτ we deduce from monotone convergence
Theorem together with Lemma A.2 that there exists a sequence (µn)n∈N of control in Aτ
such that
Vt ≥ lim
n→+∞
↑ Eδt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)JT (τ, µ
n)
]
= Eδt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu) lim
n→+∞
↑ JT (τ, µn)
]
= Eδt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)Vτ
]
,
thus concluding the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (i) We proceed in several steps.
Step 1. For δ ∈ A, it follows from the dynamic programming principle of Lemma A.3
that the process
U δt = Vt e
−γ ∫ t0 (δaudNau+δbudNbu+QudSu), t ∈ [0, T ],
defines a Pδ-supermartingale6 for all δ ∈ A. By standard analysis, we may then consider
it in its ca`dla`g version (by taking right limits along rationals). By the Doob-Meyer
decomposition, we write
U δt = M
δ
t − Aδ,ct − Aδ,dt , (30)
6Note that Eδ[UδT ] = JT (0, δ) > −∞ using Ho¨lder inequality together with (8) and the uniform
boundedness of the intensities of Na and N b. Hence the process Uδ is integrable.
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where M δ is a Pδ-martingale and Aδ = Aδ,c + Aδ,d is an integrable non-decreasing pre-
dictable process such that Aδ,c0 = A
δ,d
0 = 0, with pathwise continuous component A
δ,c, and
a piecewise constant predictable process Aδ,d.
By the martingale representation theorem under Pδ, see Lemma A.1, there exists a pre-
dictable process Z˜δ = (Z˜δ,S, Z˜δ,a, Z˜δ,b) such that
M δt = V0 +
∫ t
0
Z˜δr .dχr −
∫ t
0
Z˜δ,ar λ(δ
a
r )1I{Qr>−q¯}dr −
∫ t
0
Z˜δ,br λ(δ
b
r)1I{Qr<q¯}dr, (31)
where we recall that χ = (S,Na, N b).
Step 2. We show that V is a negative process. In fact, thanks to the uniform boundedness
of δ ∈ A, we show that
LδT
Lδt
≥ αt,T = e− kδ∞σ (NaT−Nat +NbT−Nbt )−2Ae−
kc
σ (e
kδ∞
σ +1)(T−t) > 0. (32)
Therefore,
Vt ≤ E0
[
−αt,T e−γ
(
δ∞(NaT−Nat +NbT−Nbt )+
∫ T
t QudSu
)
e−γξ
]
< 0.
Step 3. Let Y be the process defined by Vt = −e−γYt for all t ∈ [0, T ]. As Aδ,d is
a predictable point process and the jumps of (Na, N b) are totally inaccessible stopping
times under P0, we have [Na, Aδ,d] = 0 and [N b, Aδ,d] = 0 a.s, see Proposition I.2.24 in
[15]. Using Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain from (30) and (31) that
YT = ξ, and dYt = Z
a
t dN
a
t + Z
b
t dN
b
t + Z
S
t dSt − dIt − dA˜dt ,
where Za, Zb, ZS, I, A˜d are independent of δ, as they may be expressed as ZitdN
i
t =
d[Y,N i]t, i ∈ {a, b}, ZSt σ2dt = d〈Yt, St〉t, A˜d the predictable pure jumps of Y . More-
over, Itoˆ’s Formula yields
Zat = −
1
γ
log(1 +
Z˜δ,at
U δt−
)− δat , Zbt = −
1
γ
log(1 +
Z˜δ,bt
U δt−
)− δbt , ZSt = −
Z˜δ,bt
γU δt−
−Qt−,
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and
It =
∫ t
0
(
h(δr, Zr, Qr)dr − 1
γU δr
dAδ,cr
)
, A˜dt =
1
γ
∑
s≤t
log
(
1− ∆A
δ,d
t
U δt−
)
,
with h(δ, z, q) = h(δ, z, q) − 1
2
γσ2(zs)2. In particular, the last relation between A˜d and
Aδ,d shows that ∆at =
−∆Aδ,dt
Uδt−
≥ 0 is independent of δ ∈ A; recall that U δ < 0.
In order to complete the proof, we argue in the subsequent steps that Z = (ZS, Za, Zb) ∈
Z and that for t ∈ [0, T ],
Aδ,dt = −
∑
s≤t
U δs−∆as = 0, (so that A˜
d
t = 0), and It =
∫ t
0
H(Zr, Qr)dr, (33)
where H(z, q) = H(z, q)− 1
2
γσ2(zs)2.
Step 4. Since VT = −1, notice that
0 = sup
δ∈A
Eδ[U δT ]− V0 = sup
δ∈A
Eδ[U δT −M δT ]
= γ sup
δ∈A
E0
[
LδT
∫ T
0
U δr−
(
dIr − h(δr, Zr, Qr)dr + dar
γ
)]
. (34)
Moreover, since the controls are uniformly bounded, we have
U δt ≤ −βt := Vte−γδ∞(N
a
t −Na0 +Nbt−Nb0)−γ
∫ t
0 QrdSr < 0. (35)
Then, since Aδ,d ≥ 0, U δ ≤ 0, and dIt − h(δt, Zt, Qt) ≥ 0, it follows from (34) together
with the inequalities (32) and (35) that
0 ≤ sup
δ∈A
E0
[
α0,T
∫ T
0
−βr−
(
dIr − h(δr, Zr, Qr)dr + dar
γ
)]
= −E0
[
α0,T
∫ T
0
βr−
(
dIr −H(Zr, Qr)dr + dar
γ
)]
.
The quantities α0,T
∫ T
0
βr−
(
dIr−H(Zr, Qr)dr) and α0,T
∫ T
0
βrdar being non-negative ran-
dom variables, this implies (33).
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Step 5. We now prove that Z ∈ Z by showing that
sup
δ∈A
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Eδ[e−γ(p+1)Yt ] <∞ for some p > 0. (36)
Using Ho¨lder inequality together with Condition (8) and the boundedness of the intensities
of Na and N b, we have that supδ∈A Eδ[|U δT |p′+1] <∞ for some p′ > 0. Hence
sup
δ∈A
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Eδ[|U δt |p
′+1] = sup
δ∈A
Eδ[|U δT |p
′+1] <∞,
because U δ is a negative P δ-supermartingale. This leads to (36) using Ho¨lder inequality,
the uniform boundedness of the intensities ofNa andN b and that e−γY = U δeγ
∫ ·
0(δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu).
Step 6. We finally prove uniqueness of the representation. Let (Y0, Z), (Y
′
0 , Z
′) ∈ R × Z
be such that ξ = Y Y0,ZT = Y
Y ′0 ,Z
′
T . By following the line of the verification argument in the
proof of Theorem 3.1 (ii), we obtain the equality Y Y0,Zt = Y
Y ′0 ,Z
′
t by considering the value
of the continuation utility of the market maker
− exp(−γY Y0,Zt ) = − exp(−γY Y
′
0 ,Z
′
t ) = ess sup
δ∈A
Eδt [−e−γ(PL
δ
T− PLδt+ξ)], t ∈ [0, T ].
This in turn implies that ZitdN
i
t = Z
′i
tdN
i
t = d[Y
Y0,Z , N i]t, i ∈ {a, b}, and ZSt σ2dt =
Z ′St σ
2dt = d〈Y, S〉t, t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence (Y0, Z) = (Y ′0 , Z ′).
A.3 Exchange Hamiltonian maximization
Lemma A.4. Let c ∈ R, γ, η, k, σ > 0 and v1, v2 < 0. We define for z ∈ R
ϕ(z) = Ae−k
∆(z)+c
σ
(
v1e
η(z−c) − v2
(η
γ
(
1− e−γ(z+∆(z)))+ 1)),
with ∆(z) = (−δ∞) ∨
(− z + 1
γ
log(1 + σγ
k
)
) ∧ δ∞ and δ∞ > 0. Provided
δ∞ ≥ C∞ + 1
η
∣∣ log(v2
v1
)
∣∣, (37)
with C∞ = |c|+( 1η+ 1γ ) log(1+ σγk )− 1η log
(
1− σ2γη
(k+σγ)(k+ση)
)
, the function ϕ is nondecreasing
on (−∞,−δ∞ + 1γ log(1 + σγk )] and non-increasing on [δ∞ + 1γ log(1 + σγk ),∞). It admits
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a maximum on [−δ∞ + 1γ log(1 + σγk ), δ∞ + 1γ log(1 + σγk )] attained in z? given by
z? = c+
1
η
log(v2/v1) +
1
η
log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
)
.
In that case, we have
ϕ(z?) = −Cv2 exp
( k
ση
log(v2/v1)
)
,
where
C = A
ση
k
exp
(
− k
σγ
log(1 +
σγ
k
) + (1 +
k
ση
) log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
))
.
Proof. Easy but tedious computations lead to prove that ϕ is non-decreasing on (−∞,−δ∞+
1
γ
log(1 + σγ
k
)] and non-increasing on [δ∞ + 1γ log(1 +
σγ
k
),∞) if,
δ∞ ≥
∣∣∣c+ 1
η
log(v2/v1)− (1
η
+
1
γ
) log(1 +
σγ
k
)
∣∣∣.
Moreover, we notice that ϕ admits a maximum on [−δ∞+ 1γ log(1+ σγk ), δ∞+ 1γ log(1+ σγk )]
attained in
z? = c+
1
η
log(v2/v1) +
1
η
log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
)
,
as soon as δ∞ ≥ | − z? + 1γ log(1 + σγk )|. By combining these two conditions, we get the
result under Condition (37) on δ∞.
A.4 On the verification argument for the exchange problem
The proof of the main result of Theorem 4.1 requires the following technical result. We
observe that this is the place where Condition (7) is needed.
Lemma A.5. Let Z ∈ Z. There exists C > 0 and ε > 0 such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |1+ε] ≤ C.
Proof. We recall the definition of KZ for Z ∈ Z
KZt = e
−η
(
c(Nat −Na0 +Nbt−Nb0)−Y 0,Zt
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Let p > 1. By using Ho¨lder’s inequality and the uniform boundedness of the intensities
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of Na and N b, we deduce that there exists C ′ > 0 such that
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |p] ≤ C ′E0[(e−γY
0,Z
t )−
p′η
γ ]
p
p′ ,
with any p′ > p. Thus,
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |p] ≤ C ′
(
1 + E0[(e−γY
0,Z
t )−
p′η
γ ]
)
= C ′
(
1 + E0
[
(− sup
δ∈A
Eδt [−e−γ(Y
0,Z
T +PL
δ
T−PLδt )])−
p′η
γ
])
.
From Jensen’s inequality and then Ho¨lder’s inequality, we deduce that for any p′′ > p′ we
have
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |p] ≤ C ′
(
1 + E0
[
sup
δ∈A
Eδt [ep
′η(Y 0,ZT +PL
δ
T−PLδt )]
])
≤ C ′
(
1 + E0
[
sup
δ∈A
Eδt [ep
′′ηY 0,ZT ]
])
.
By using a dynamic programming principle, similarly to the proof of Lemma A.3 by
noticing that the family
(
J˜(µ, δ) = Eδτ [ep
′′ηY 0,ZT ]
)
µ∈Aτ
is directly upwards, we get
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |p] ≤ C ′
(
1 + sup
δ∈A
Eδ
[
ep
′′ηY 0,ZT
])
.
By setting ε = η
′−η
3
, if we take p = 1 + ε, then p′ = p+ ε and p′′ = p′ + ε, we obtain
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |1+ε] ≤ C ′
(
1 + sup
δ∈A
Eδ
[
eη
′Y 0,ZT
])
.
From the definition of Z (involving the condition (7)), we get for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |1+ε] ≤ C,
with C = C ′
(
1 + supδ∈A Eδ
[
eη
′Y 0,ZT
])
< +∞.
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